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Auriesville Pilgrimage Recap: Pictures, Sermons, and District Superior's Comments on Crisis

James Austin

The weekend of September 7-9 2018 marked the 25th anniversary of the Society of Saint Pius X's pilgrimage to Auriesville, NY, to the site of the National Shrine of the North American Martyrs. It was in Auriesville that three of the eight North American Martyrs, St. René Goupil, St. Isaac Jogues, and St. John de Lalande were martyred, and where St. Kateri Tekakwitha was born and grew up. Around 500 faithful came from the Northeast area to honor the martyrs of Auriesville through this event.    

The pilgrimage began on Friday night with Mass, a campfire, and sung Compline. On Saturday morning pilgrims gathered for a pep talk and a blessing by Fr. Richard Boyle before beginning the ten-mile walk. A life-size statue of our Lady of Fatima, carried by the men and boys of Christ the King parish in Ridgefield, CT, accompanied the faithful on this year’s pilgrimage. The statue was preceded by the boys of Blessed Virgin Mary Academy in Warners, NY, who led the pilgrimage with a large wooden cross. Following the statue came the girls of the academy, who livened the spirit of the pilgrimage by singing chants and hymns along the way.

The midday talk, given by Fr. Steven Soos, highlighted the 25th anniversary of the SSPX's pilgrimage, touched on the message of Our Lady of Fatima, and the crisis unfolding in the Catholic Church.

Upon reaching the shrine, the triumphant but weary pilgrims consummated the pilgrimage with a procession and a solemn high Mass in the shrine. There, the SSPX District Superior of the United States, Fr. Jurgen Wegner, preached about the lessons we can draw from the past and how to apply it to the troubled time in which we live.

Notably, Fr. Wegner made his first public statement on the now unfolding Cardinal McCarrick scandal as well as the Pennsylvania Attorney General's report. Fr. Wegner Stated:

...What can we learn in this troubled period of the church, after this report of the grand jury? After this scandal of Cardinal McCarrick, which reveal sins, weaknesses, in Christian souls, in priests, in bishops, in cardinals... Which are scandalous! Which every Christian has to condemn. But we have to make sure that it will not happen, again. That it will not happen in our circles."

While many left after the Te Deum marking the end of Mass to make the long drive home, others chose to camp overnight in order to attend  the Sunday Mass which officially closed the pilgrimage.

Check out the Photos of this year's pilgrimage below!

SSPX Ordinations 2018 - Bishop Tissier Sermon & Photo Gallery

Vox Catholica

On Friday, June 22nd, 2018, the Catholic Church welcomed 7 new priests, ordained by Bishop Bernard Tissier de Mallerais of the Society of Saint Pius at their new Seminary in Dillwyn, Virginia.

Those seven new priests are:

  • Fr. Thomas Buschmann
  • Fr. Samuel Fabula
  • Fr. John Graziano
  • Fr. Michael Sheahan
  • Fr. Thomas Tamm
  • Fr. Nicolas McManus
  • Fr. Thomas O’Hart

Below are photographs of their ordination, as well as photos from the first masses of Fr. Sheahan, Fr. Fabula and Father O'Hart. 

Sunday Sermon: Corpus Christi and The Real Presence

Vox Catholica

In this Sunday sermon, Father Robinson discusses the decline of Ireland (in regards to the recent vote to legalize abortion), and since the Feast of Corpus Christi fell on a weekday, the solemnity of this feast was transferred to the following Sunday. Father discusses the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and it's transformative effect on our lives, if we co-operate with God's grace.

Pope Francis Continues Destroying The Church: "Ok To Be Gay"

James Austin

At this point, I don't understand how anyone can continue to hold the delusion that Pope Francis is being "taken out of context" by the Main Stream Media. We've had multiple interviews with Eugenio Scalfari, the most recent of which caused an uproar when it was reported that Francis denied the existence of Hell - a basic dogma of the Church, one that must be believed in order to be saved. 

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Today, faithful Catholics all throughout the world recoiled in horror at yet another interview being released where the Pope goes completely off the rails, blurring distinctions, and (as far as the public is concerned) going as far as condoning the homosexual lifestyle.

According to The Sun and LA Times the Pope has told a "gay man ‘God made you like this and loves you like this’".

In the Times' article, Juan Carlos Cruz, a Chilean victim of priestly sexual abuse, is reported to have spoken with the pope about his homosexuality:

"He told me: 'Juan Carlos, I don't care about you being gay. God made you that way and loves you as you are and I don't mind. The pope loves you as you are, you have to be happy with who you are.' "

When asked for a comment, the Vatican Press Office stated: 

"We don't normally comment on the pope's private conversations."

Despite the fact, that Francis has been presented with the Correctio Filialis which essentially states that the Pope has at least allowed heresy to spread like a cancer throughout the Church, and despite the famous statement in 2013 in regards to homosexuality "who am I to judge?" it seems clear that the Pope is using these private interactions with people in an effort to move the Church in a more progressive direction, without the need for Synods, Encyclicals, or Ex-Cathedra Pronouncements.

For those of you, who still believe that the pope has been mis-quoted, I give you some words of wisdom from Steve Skojec from 1Peter5.com

Sunday Sermon: Motherhood In God - Mother's Day 2018

Vox Catholica

In this sermon, Father Robinson discusses Motherhood, in relation to our Divine Mother, and the parents duty to properly raise and educate their children.

In 1994 the Swiss carried out a survey to determine whether a person’s religion carried through to the next generation, and if so, why, or if not, why not. They found that the religious practice of the father of the family determines the future church attendance or non-attendance of the children.

If both father and mother attend regularly, 33% of their children will end up as regular churchgoers, and 41% will end up attending irregularly. Only a 1/4 of their children will end up not practicing at all. If the father is irregular and mother regular, only 3% of the children will subsequently become regulars themselves, while a further 59% will become irregulars. 38% will be lost. If the father is non-practicing and mother regular, only 2% of children will become regular worshippers, and 37% will attend irregularly. Over 60% of their children will be lost completely to the church.

What is most startling is when the father is regular but the mother irregular the percentage of children becoming regular goes up from 33% to 38%! When the father is regular but the mother non-practicing their children's regular attendance goes up further still, to 44%!

Catholic Catechism: On Ignorance And Sin

Vox Catholica

Article 1. Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin.

Objection 2. Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above (I-II:75:1). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.

Objection 3. Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good apprehended. Therefore ignorancecannot be a cause of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance."

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinfulact; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human acts.

Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1).

Reply to Objection 1. Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.

Reply to Objection 2. As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignoranceof this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.

Reply to Objection 3. The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.

Article 2. Whether ignorance is a sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above (I-II:71:5). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

Objection 2. Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.

Objection 3. Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather a result of sin.

Objection 4. Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin.

Objection 5. Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to 1 Corinthians 14:38: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin.

I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a naturalaptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (I-II:71:6 ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.

Reply to Objection 2. Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledgeby his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.

Reply to Objection 3. Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin.

Reply to Objection 4. Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin.

Reply to Objection 5. Just as in other sins of omissionman sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he ought to have.

Article 3. Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (I-II:6:8). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Objection 2. Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous.

Objection 3. Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin.

I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (Articles 1 and 2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledgewere to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.

On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this manwill defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply to Objection 1. Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (I-II:6:8). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply to Objection 2. So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental.

Reply to Objection 3. If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.

Article 4. Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?

Objection 1. It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Objection 2. Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore it does not diminish a sin.

Objection 3. Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrosecommenting on Romans 2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Objection 4. Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorancewhich removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosophersays (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Timothy 1:13: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.

I answer that, Since every sin is voluntaryignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorancewhich is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin.

Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.

Reply to Objection 1. The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.

Reply to Objection 2. One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.

Reply to Objection 3. The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice.

Reply to Objection 4. The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (Reply to Objection 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).

Catholic Catechism: On The Causes Of Sin

Vox Catholica

In this lesson, Father addresses Question 75 of the Summa Theologica, on the causes of Sin.

•Does sin have a cause?
•Does it have an internal cause?
•Does it have an external cause?
•Is one sin the cause of another?

Article 1. Whether sin has a cause?

Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (I-II:71:6). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.

Objection 2. Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sinhas no cause.

Objection 3. Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for "a good tree cannot bring forth evilfruit" (Matthew 7:18). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause.

On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job 5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore sin has a cause.

I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable goodcausesthe act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.

Reply to Objection 1. Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained.

Reply to Objection 2. If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.

Reply to Objection 3. As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.

Article 2. Whether sin has an internal cause?

Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal causeman would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.

Objection 2. Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the causeof sin.

Objection 3. Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain further on (I-II:77:1. Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.

But since we have said above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.

Reply to Objection 1. That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.

Reply to Objection 2. It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.

Reply to Objection 3. That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe.

Article 3. Whether sin has an external cause?

Objection 1. It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause.

Objection 2. Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause.

Objection 3. Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Numbers 21:16): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (I-II:9:6I-II:10:4), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (I-II:79:1. Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being accomplished.

Reply to Objection 1. From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.

Reply to Objection 2. The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3. If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary and in our power.

Article 4. Whether one sin is a cause of another?

Objection 1. It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.

Objection 2. Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.

Objection 3. Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another.

On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin."

I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because acts causedispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, as stated above (I-II:1:3Question 18, Articles 4 and 6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material while the latter is formal.

Reply to Objection 1. Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the causeof another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.

Reply to Objection 3. Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is not caused by another sin.

Tommy Robinson's Speech Against Islam at "Day For Freedom" Event

James Austin

The Islam problem is getting worse and worse in Europe as each day goes by. Native Germans are now a minority in the town of Frankfurt, where for the first time in history, they are outnumbered by predominantly Islamic migrants. London, which is now a majority non-English city has the highest crime rates in the world, surpassing even New York City. And parts of France, Sweeden, England and Germany have all been turned in to Islamic No-Go-Zones.

In the United Kingdom, one man who has been speaking out against this Islamic invasion of Europe is Tommy Robinson, who was recently banned from Twitter under new 'hate speech' directives issued by U.K. Counter-Terrorism.

In a reaction against the banning of not only Tommy Robinson, but also popular Twitter accounts like Sargon of Akkad and Milo, the detention of Catholic and Identitarian Activists Brittany Pettibone and Martin Sellner, and the detention and interrogation of Lauren Southern, an event was held in Whitehall, Central London to combat against censorship, and for citizens to exercise their rights to free speech.

Of all the speeches given today, Tommy Robinson's speech was head and shoulders above the rest, because he wasn't just speaking about the "value" of classically liberal ideals. He was using his right to speak the truth about this foreign, dangerous ideology that will eventually overthrow Europe and turn it into a Caliphate.

Here is a transcript of Tommy's speech today and the "Day for Freedom" event:

“The people of this country have been silenced for 20 to 30 years with the tag of “racist”. They have managed to silence people so they’re too scared to speak up when they see things that are wrong. They’re too scared to tell the truth and identify problems with an ideology and a religion in our country because they’re worried about being called racist.

"They've now realized that that tag is dead. No one cares anymore about being labelled as a racist. So they’ve now introduced their new term “Hate Speech”. What is hate speech?

 Violent "Anti-Fascist" demonstrators spark violence outside of free-speech demonstration in Whitehall.

Violent "Anti-Fascist" demonstrators spark violence outside of free-speech demonstration in Whitehall.

"There’s a 16 year old boy somewhere in here, and I’ll interview him next week, he went to speakers corner and he debated Ali Dawah. And he stated facts about Islam. He was visited last week by counterterrorism officials as part of the “Prevent Strategy”. His mother was in pieces, crying, scared, worried… The justification the police give for visiting him… They asked him questions like “would you kill for your ideology”. There’s another man up in Birmingham who this has happened to. The reason the police give for visiting him, is that they don’t like his opinions on Islam.

"This is currently what our country is facing. When you hear statistics, and they say that 30% of all prevent strategy is now non-Muslims. This is all from counter-terrorism. For telling the truth, for identifying facts […] This boy in the north of England had a mental breakdown because of the visits from Prevent, because he said that Islam was a fascist, violent ideology.

"These are scare tactics, and I tell you what, it works[…] So one boy tells the truth about Islam at Speakers Corner, and then everyone else sees that counter terrorism visited him. That has an effect. People become scared. People are terrified to identify and speak openly and honestly.

"We’ve just seen that my Twitter account was removed for “hate”. The “hate”… All the things that they suspended me for, I said that 90% of grooming gang convictions are Muslim men. That is a fact. that is not hate. 20% of them are named Mohammed. But what they removed my Twitter account for, is for saying that Islam promotes killing people. It does! 100 verses in the koran are incitement to kill! Again, it was a fact. Now when we see the news reports (this is where we can’t be fooled) our government… There’s been 10,000 Twitter accounts closed at the request of the government for hate. There’s been 140 Twitter accounts closed for terrorism.

"Hamas, a recognized terrorist organization has a Twitter account. Hezbollah, a recognized terrorist organization has a Twitter account. This is not about rules or regulations, or breaching those rules. This is about silencing and stopping. Silencing people like me. Milo has had his Twitter account closed. Sargon has had his Twitter account closed. Where we’re heading in a few years time, Facebook, Google, YouTube will all remove our views.”

A massive crowd gathers to hear Tommy Robinson speak at "A Day For Freedom" Event in Whitehall London.

“Now, the country I thought I lived in, prior to 2009, and the freedoms I thought we had, and the learning curve I’ve gone on since 2009; we live in a post-free speech era. There’s no pretending it. We don’t have free speech. Everyone talks about free speech. We have no right to free speech in the U.K.. Do anyone really feel free saying their opinions? Do you feel free with your bosses at work? Most people have to hide the fact that they come to these demonstrations! That’s not freedom! We should be free to criticize whatever we want. We’re being lied to, we’re being deceived. 

"When you go back through British history, when you go back through British world leaders, when you go back through our clergy, our military leaders, our politicians, Sir William Gladstone, Winston Churchill; they always told the truth about Islam!

"The truth that Islam is a war-like religion. That it’s fascist, that it’s violent. Only in the last 30, 40 years are we being fed a lie. Look at the term “Islam is a religion of peace”. You try and find that in the history books, you won’t find that term. That was brought out after September 11th, when George Bush lied to the world.

"Never before have people been deceived so bad. We’ve let an ideology into our countries, to gain control of towns and cities, to infiltrate our government, to run as mayors in our capitol city! All under the guise and the lie. They’re taking our children to mosques. The education system is lying. And when it turns, because it will turn, it will turn in Europe, it will turn in England and it will turn so quickly, everyone will finally be able to speak openly and honestly. Everyone will identify the problem with it.”

“We know what people think. We know people are aware of the problem, but no one says it. And if I say one message to everyone, it’s start small. Everyone tell the truth. Speak openly, speak honestly. Speak about Islam.”

Tommy has written a book, decoding the Qu'ran, and exposing this murderous ideology for what it is. Pick up a copy online at Amazon!

Our Lady of Good Success and the Crisis in the Catholic Church

James Austin

Father Adam Purdy of the Society of Saint Pius X, held a conference in Quito, Ecuador on January 30th, 2018. Father Purdy described in detail the Crisis of Faith in the Catholic Church, and the crisis in the social and political orders due to the absence of the Kingship of Christ, and His Grace in our Society.

Father dissects everything from Vatican II to the numerous priestly scandals plaguing the Church, to the recent assaults on the Sacrament of Matrimony through the lens of the apparitions of Nuestra Señora del Buen Suceso, "Our Lady of Good Success of the Purification" in Quito, between 1594-1634.

Catholic Catechism: On The Severity And Distinction Of Sins - Part 2

Vox Catholica

In this Catholic Catechism class, Father continues his talk on Question 73 articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 on the distinctions of sins and weather some sins are worse than others.

He starts his talk by making some notes on the virtue of Prudence, which should always direct the actions of Catholics.

Catholic Catechism: Are Some Sins More Severe Than Others?

Vox Catholica

In this Catholic Catechism class, Father reviews what we have learned in previous classes. Namely, whether virtue can exist in a soul where mortal sin is present, the distinction between Natural Virtues and Supernatural Virtues, the Formed Virtues (With Charity) and the Informed Virtues (Without Charity).

After this brief review, father continues with our study of the Summa Theologica with Question 73: On The Comparison of one sin to another.

The Question discussed can be found at: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2073.htm

At 27:00, Father discusses how Catholics should deal with homosexuality and homosexual persons (people suffering from same-sex attraction). Father lays out a charitable way of leading these individuals to the life of grace.

Catholic Catechism: Distinguishing Types of Sins

Vox Catholica

In this Catechism lesson from the late 1980's, Father teaches us about the different kinds of sin according to the method of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Father covers the differences between Venial and Mortal sins, sins of the Flesh and sins of the Spirit, what constitutes a Mortal sin, the sins of the Angels and much more.

This catechism follows very closely Question 72 in the First Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Question 72 specifically asks the following questions:

  • Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?
  • Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?
  • Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?
  • Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?
  • Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?
  • Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?
  • Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?
  • Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?
  • Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?

The question from the Summa Theologica being discussed here can be found online, here: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2072.htm